Abstract. We study the relationship between obfuscation and white-box cryptography. We capture the requirements of any white-box primitive using a White-Box Property (WBP) and give some negative/positive results. Loosely speaking, the WBP is defined for some scheme and a security notion (we call the pair a specification), and implies that w.r.t. the specification, an obfuscation does not leak any "useful" information, even though it may leak some "useless" non-black-box information. Our main result is a negative one -for most interesting programs, an obfuscation (under any definition) cannot satisfy the WBP for every specification in which the program may be present. To do this, we define a Universal White-Box Property (UWBP), which if satisfied, would imply that under whatever specification we conceive, the WBP is satisfied. We then show that for every non-approximately-learnable family, there exist certain (contrived) specifications for which the WBP (and thus, the UWBP) fails. On the positive side, we show that there exists an obfuscator for a non-approximately-learnable family that achieves the WBP for a certain specification. Furthermore, there exists an obfuscator for a nonlearnable (but approximately-learnable) family that achieves the UWBP. Our results can also be viewed as formalizing the distinction between "useful" and "useless" non-blackbox information.
Introduction
Informally, an obfuscator O is a probabilistic compiler that transforms a program P into O(P ), an executable implementation of P which hides certain functional characteristics of P . Starting from the seminal work of Barak et al. [2] , several definitions for obfuscators have been proposed [20, 21, 24] , each one based on some sort of virtual black-box property (VBBP) . Loosely speaking, the VBBP requires that whatever we could do using the obfuscated program, we could also have done using black-box access to the original program. The notion of "whatever" can be captured using several formalisms. The following are the common ones (in decreasing order of generality):
1. Computing something that is indistinguishable from the obfuscation [2, 20, 21, 24] . 2. Computing some function [2] . 3. Computing some predicate [2] .
White-box Cryptography
White-box cryptography (WBC) , which requires that some given scheme must remain secure even if the adversary is given "white-box access" to a functionality instead of just black-box access, is an active field of research. Informally, white-box access implies that the adversary is given an executable implementation of the algorithm that was used inside the black-box [11, 12] . Existing notions of WBC only deal with the encryption algorithm of symmetric block-ciphers. In this work, we generalize this intuition to any cryptographic primitive. For instance, we can use WBC to convert a MAC into a signature scheme by white-boxing the verification algorithm.
White-Box Security. The (black-box) security of any primitive is captured using a security notion (e.g., IND-CPA) where the adversary is given black-box access to some functionality (e.g., encryption), and a white-box implementation can be required to satisfy that security notion when the adversary is given access to a white-boxed version of the functionality.
Motivation
One way to realize WBC is to obfuscate (using an obfuscator) the executable code of the algorithm and hope that the adversary cannot use it in a non-black-box manner. What we would like is, given an obfuscator satisfying some definition, a white-box implementation can be proved secure under some security notion. Furthermore, if a scheme is required to satisfy several security notions simultaneously (Authenticated Encryption (AE) [4] and the Obfuscated Virtual Machine (OVM) of [19] are two such examples, where both confidentiality and integrity needs to be satisfied), we would like the obfuscation to ensure that all the security notions are satisfied in the white-box variant if they are satisfied in the black-box variant. However, it is still not fully clear if any of the existing definitions of obfuscators can be used to achieve these goals. Hence, a natural question is:
Given an obfuscator satisfying the virtual black-box property for a program P (in some sense), and some scheme that is secure when the adversary is given black-box access to P , can it be proved (without additional assumptions) that the scheme remains secure when the adversary is also given access to the obfuscated program O(P )?
Our Contribution
1. In this paper we answer the above question in the negative -we show that under whatever definition of obfuscation we use, the answer to the above question is, in general, no. To do this, we first define the objective(s) of a white-box primitive, which we formalize using a white-box property (WBP). Our main observation is that when considering obfuscation of most programs P , we must also take into account the scheme plus the security notion (i.e., the specification) in which P is used. Furthermore, we show that for most programs P , there cannot exist an obfuscator that satisfies the WBP for all specifications in which P might be present. To do this, we define a universal white-box property (UWBP) which, if satisfied, would imply that in whatever specification P might be present, the obfuscated program O(P ) will not leak any "useful" information. We then show that for every non-approximately-learnable program P , there exists some specification in which the obfuscation leaks useful information, thereby failing the UWBP. 2. On the positive side, we have the following two results.
(a) We show that under reasonable computational assumptions, there exists an obfuscator that satisfies the WBP w.r.t. some meaningful specification for a non-approximately-learnable program P .
(b) We show that there exist obfuscators that satisfy UWBP for a program that is non-learnable but approximately learnable.
Related Work
Practical white-box implementations of DES and AES encryption algorithms were proposed in [11, 12] . However, no definitions of obfuscation were given, neither were there any proofs of security. With their subsequent cryptanalysis [6, 17, 25] , it remains an open question whether or not such white-box implementations exist. The notion of code-obfuscation was first given by Hada in [18] , which introduced the concept of virtual black-box property (VBBP) using computational indistinguishability. In [2] , Barak et al. defined obfuscation using the weaker predicate-based VBBP and showed that there exist unobfuscatable function families under their definition. Goldwasser and Kalai [13] extend the impossibility results of [2] w.r.t. auxiliary inputs.
On the positive side, there have been several results too. For instance, Lynn et al. show in [22] how to obfuscate point functions in the random oracle model. Wee in [24] showed how to obfuscate point functions without random oracles. Hohenberger et al. [21] used a stronger notion of obfuscation (average-case secure obfuscation) and showed how it can be used to prove the security of re-encryption functionality in a weak security model (i.e., IND-CPA). They also presented a re-encryption scheme under bilinear complexity assumptions. Hofheinz et al. [20] discuss a related notion of obfuscation and show that IND-CPA encryption and point functions can be securely obfuscated in their definition. Goldwasser and Rothblum [16] define the notion of "best-possible obfuscation" in order to give a qualitative measure of information leakage by an obfuscation (however, they do not differentiate between "useful" and "useless" information). Recently, Canetti and Dakdouk [10] give an obfuscator for point functions with multi-bit output for use in primitives called "digital lockers". Finally, Herzberg et al. [19] introduce the concept of White-Box Remote Program Execution (WBRPE) in order to give a meaningful notion of "software hardening" for all programs and avoid the negative results of [2] .
However, till date, there has not been much work done on the relationship between arbitrary white-box primitives and obfuscation. This paper is intended to fill this gap.
Preliminaries
Denote by P the set of all positive polynomials and by TM the set of all Turing Machines (TMs). All TMs considered in this paper are deterministic (a probabilistic TM is simply a deterministic TM with randomness on the input tape). A mapping f :
For simplicity, we define the input-space of arbitrary TMs to be {0, 1} * , the set of all strings. If, however, the input-space of a TM is well defined and efficiently samplable (for instance, the strings should be of a particular encoding), then we implicitly imply that the inputs are chosen from the input-space sampled using a string from {0, 1} * . All our definitions and results apply in this extended setting without any loss of generality. 
We denote the set of all PTMFs by PTMF.
(the probability taken over the coin tosses of L) and:
L is called the learner for Q. We denote the set of all learnable families by LF.
(the probability taken over the coin tosses of L), and:
We denote the set of all approx. learnable families by ALF.
, then the following holds:
The symbol (A) indicates that A is optional in the above statement.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that for any given Q 1 ∈ PTMF that is not learnable, there exists some (Q 2 , p) ∈ PTMF × poly such that the LHS of the above implication is satisfied but RHS is not. Let L 1 and L 2 be the learners for Q 1 and Q 2 respectively. L 1 runs L 2 using its own oracle to answer
2 in a polynomial (of |q 2 |) number of steps, which is a polynomial function of |q 1 | by assumption, a contradiction.
⊓ ⊔
Obfuscators
In this work, we only consider obfuscation of PTMFs with a uniformly selected key, and not of a single PTM. As is common in cryptography, we define the functionality of the obfuscator using a correctness property and the security using a soundness property. In contrast to existing works, however, we define an obfuscator using only the correctness property. This is to consider different notions of "white-box" security (which might be unrelated to soundness) and still be able to use the word "obfuscator" in a formal sense.
Obfuscator (Correctness)
Definition 2. A randomized algorithm O : PTMF × {0, 1} * → TM satisfies correctness for Q ∈ PTMF if the following two properties are satisfied:
1. Approx. functionality:
the probability taken over the coin tosses of O. 2 
Polynomial slowdown and expansion:
There exists p ∈ P s.t.
and ∀a, if Q q (a) halts in t steps then O(Q, q)(a) halts in at most p(t) steps.
We say the O is efficient if O ∈ PPT.
If O satisfies correctness for Q, we say that O is an obfuscator for Q.
Obfuscator (Soundness)
Over recent years, several definitions of soundness have been proposed, all based on some sort of Virtual Black-Box Property (VBBP) [2, 20, 21, 22, 24] . Let Q ∈ PTMF and let q ∈ {0, 1} * . Loosely speaking, the VBBP requires that whatever information about q a PPT adversary computes given the obfuscation O(Q, q), a PPT simulator could also have computed using only black-box access to Q q . All existing notions of VBBP can be classified into one of two broad categories. At one extreme (the weakest) are the predicate-based definitions, where the adversary and the simulator are required to compute some predicate of q. At the other extreme (the strongest) are definitions based on computational indistinguishability, where the simulator is required to output something that is indistinguishable from O(Q, q). We define these two notions below. Our definitions are based on that of [13] , where an auxiliary input is also considered.
Definition 3. An obfuscator O for Q ∈ PTMF satisfies soundness for Q if at least one of the properties given below is satisfied.
Predicate Virtual black-box property (PVBBP): Let π be any efficiently verifiable predicate on
, the probability taken over the coin tosses of O, A, S. 3 
Computational Indistinguishability (IND): O satisfies IND for Q if
, the probability taken over the coin tosses of O, A, S.
Depending on the property satisfied, we call it IND-soundness or PVBBP-soundness (note that the former implies the latter).
It has been noted (but never proved) in several papers (e.g., [2, 21] ) that the PVBBP is too weak for practical purposes. Furthermore, it has been noted that the IND-soundness is too strong to be satisfied in practice [21, 24] . In fact, it is easy to prove: Proposition 1. If there exists an obfuscator satisfying IND-soundness for some Q ∈ PTMF then Q ∈ ALF. 4 Nevertheless, it is conceivable that a definition of soundness can be formulated falling somewhere between the two extremes, which is neither too weak nor too strong, and can be used for proving security of arbitrary white-box primitives. We show this is not the case. Specifically, we show that, under whatever definition of soundness we use, for every family Q / ∈ ALF, there exist (contrived) specifications for which white-box security fails but the corresponding black-box construction is secure. 5 
White-box Cryptography (WBC)
In this section, we formalize the notion of WBC by defining a white-box property (WBP). A key concept of our model is the notion of a (cryptographic) specification. Informally, a specification is a self-contained description (in some formal language) of a cryptographic scheme (such as RSA-OAEP) along with a corresponding security notion (such as IND-CPA). We follow the basic principles of various "game-based" approaches [3, 5, 14, 15] where a security notion is captured using an interactive game between an adversary and a challenger. In our model, the role of the challenger is played by an experiment and the corresponding game is called a simulation. We denote by SPEC the set of all specifications.
Black-Box Simulation
Let spec ∈ SPEC denote the specification of some scheme (e.g., "IND-CPA security notion for symmetric encryption scheme X"). Every such spec defines a Black-box simulation (or simply simulation) between an experiment and an adversary.
Experiment. The experiment for spec, written Expt spec is a TM having six tapes: (1) a read-only experiment-input tape, (2) a writable adversary-input tape, (3) a read-only query-input tape, (4) a writable query-response tape, (5) a read-only adversary-output tape, and (6) a writable experiment-output tape Adversary. The adversary A ∈ PPT is an algorithm having four tapes (along with an unknown source of randomness via a random input tape): (1) a read-only adversary-input tape, (2) a writable query-input tape, (3) a read-only query-response tape, and (4) a writable adversary-output tape Simulation. A simulation is an interactive protocol between the experiment and the adversary when their tapes coincide, and is started by invoking the experiment via the experiment-input tape.
-The experiment-input tape contains two inputs: (1) a string of k 1s, where k is a security parameter, and (2) a random string r of p in (k) bits for some p in ∈ P. -During the simulation, the experiment and the adversary interact using the common tapes. The adversary terminates after writing a string on the adversary-output tape. -The simulation ends when the experiment writes a result on the experiment-output tape.
-We require the result to be either 0 (indicating A lost) or 1 (A won).
-We denote by Expt spec A the simulation, and by Expt spec A (1 k , r) the result when the experimentinput tape contains (1 k , r).
-Every experiment must be based on the following template:
If (win(r, QuerySet, s)) output 1 else output 0 The following discussion is based on the above template.
• We do not allow the oracles used by A to maintain state between successive queries 6 and assume that a query takes one unit time irrespective of the amount of computation involved.
• We require that at any instant A can query at most one oracle.
• We require that if r is uniformly distributed then so are the keys q i (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
• The run-time of A is upper-bounded by p run (k) steps for some p run ∈ P (specified in spec).
• QuerySet is a set representing the queries made by A during the simulation. Each element j of this set is an ordered tuple of the type
indicating respectively, the time, oracle number, input, and the output of each query.
• win is (the PTM description of) an efficiently computable predicate on (r, QuerySet, s).
• We say that a family Q ∈ spec if Q ∈ {Q i } 1≤i≤n .
Definition 4. We define
the probability taken over the coin tosses of A.
Definition 5. (Obfuscatable family) For any PTMF
We say that Q i is obfuscatable in spec (written Q i ∈ obf spec) if ∀r, QuerySet, s : win(r, QuerySet, s) = win(r, QuerySet i , s).
(In other words, Q i ∈ spec is obfuscatable if every element of QuerySet corresponding to oracle Q q i i can be removed without affecting the win predicate). Remark 1. We claim that it is meaningless to talk about white-box security of specifications where the PTMF to be white-boxed is not-obfuscatable, since it is impossible to keep track of "queries" made by an adversary to an obfuscated program. As an example, it is meaningless to talk about obfuscating the decryption oracle of an encryption scheme (or the 'signing' oracle of a MAC scheme).
An example of a specification for the IND-CCA2 notion of some symmetric encryption scheme is given in Appendix A.
White-box Simulation
Let Expt spec A capture the security of some spec ∈ SPEC (using the template of §5.1). Let O be an obfuscator for some Q i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that Q i ∈ obf spec. Define the corresponding white-box experiment for (spec, Q i ) as follows:
If (win(r, QuerySet, s)) output 1 else output 0 -As before, we bound the running time of ExptWB spec,Q i A,O to p run (k) steps.
Definition 6. We define
the probability taken over the coin tosses of A, O.
Definition 7. (White-box Property (WBP))
Let O be an obfuscator for Q i ∈ PTMF and let spec be such that Q i ∈ obf spec. We say that O satisfies WBP for (Q i , spec) if the following holds:
The term min 
Definition 8. (Universal White-box Property (UWBP))
Let O be an obfuscator for Q ∈ PTMF. We say that O satisfies UWBP for Q if for every spec ∈ SPEC with Q ∈ obf spec, O satisfies white-box property for (Q, spec).
In this section we give some useful relationships between obfuscators, WBP and UWBP.
Negative results
We note that Barak et al.'s impossibility results [2] also apply our definitions. In our model, their results can be interpreted as the following:
There exists a pair (Q, spec) ∈ PTMF × SPEC with Q ∈ obf spec such that every obfuscator for Q fails to satisfy WBP for (Q, spec).
In other words, there cannot exist a obfuscator that satisfies UWBP for every Q. However, their results do not rule out an obfuscator that satisfies the UWBP for some useful family Q. We show that even this is not possible unless Q is at least approx. learnable. For every family Q ∈ PTMF\ALF, there exists a (contrived) spec ∈ SPEC such that Q ∈ obf spec but every obfuscator for Q fails to satisfy the WBP for (Q, spec).
Proof. Let Q ∈ PTMF\ALF. Consider spec = f ind-q ′ captured below.
Family Q(Key q, Input X) { 3.
/* Description of Q (used as a black-box) */ 4. } 5.
Family
If (Y (a) = Q q (a)) output q ′ else output 0 8. /* In the above, (the description of) Q is used as a black-box */ 9. /* Y is allowed to run for at most p(|a|) steps (for some p ∈ P) */ 10. } 11.
Function f (Input r) { 12.
Parse r as q, q ′ , a 13.
/* we require that a ∈ I Q,|q| ∧ |q
If (s = q ′ and at most one query to Q q 1 1 ) output 1 else output 0 Observe that Q ∈ obf f ind-q ′ . Since Q / ∈ ALF, therefore by virtue of Definitions 1.7 and 2.1, for sufficiently large random q, q ′ , a (and thus, k), the following inequalities are guaranteed to hold:
where α, β are negligible functions. Hence, we have:
which is non-negligible in k. This proves the theorem.
⊓ ⊔ Remark 2. The above result applies because the approx. functionality requirement for obfuscators (in the correctness definition of §2) is defined only for PTMFs considered as deterministic. What about the extended definitions (such as in [20, 21] ) which allow probabilistic families? It turns out that a similar technique can be used for probabilistic families using appropriately extended definitions. This aspect is discussed in §7.
Remark 3. Although we define ALF to be the set of families which can be approximately-learned with a non-negligible advantage (which is quite broad), we note that the above result can be further strengthened by narrowing down the definition of ALF to only families that can be approximatelylearned with an overwhelming advantage.
Our next result deals with multiple obfuscations. 
the probability taken over the coin tosses of A, O. We say that O satisfies WBP for ((Q i , Q j ), spec) if the following holds:
Then there exists a spec ∈ SPEC with Q i , Q j ∈ obf spec such that even if there exists an obfuscator for Q 1 , Q 2 satisfying WBP for (Q i , spec) and (Q j , spec), every obfuscator fails to satisfy WBP for ((Q i , Q j ), spec)
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
Positive Results
Although the above results rule out the possibility of obfuscators satisfying UWBP for most nontrivial families, they do not imply that a meaningful definition of security for white-box cryptography cannot exist. In fact, any asymmetric encryption scheme can be considered as a white-boxed version of the corresponding symmetric scheme (where the encryption key is also secret). We use this observation as a starting point of our first positive result. A similar observation was used in the positive results of [20] . Proof. For simplicity, we prove the above result in the random oracle model. Then under the assumption that there exist hash functions equivalent to random oracles, our result can be lifted to the plain model. Consider the family Q defined below:
If Random-Oracle |q| (q||X) = q output 1 else output 0 3. } Here, Random-Oracle |q| is a random oracle mapping arbitrary strings to |q|-bit strings. First note that indeed Q ∈ PTMF ∩ ALF\LF. It can be proved that ∀D ∈ PPT (the distinguisher),
the probability taken over the coin tosses of D. For any k, let q
Consider an obfuscator O that takes in as input (Q, q) and simply outputs a description of Q q as the obfuscation of Q q . Let spec ∈ SPEC be such that Q ∈ obf spec but O does not satisfy WBP for (Q, spec) w.r.t. some adversary A ∈ PPT. If A has a non-negligible white-box advantage w.r.t. (O, Q, spec), then A can be directly converted into a distinguisher D such that Equation 1 does not hold, thereby arriving at a contradiction.
The Case Of Probabilistic PTMFs
In this section, we consider probabilistic (i.e., randomized) functions based on the definitions of [20, 21] . In contrast to conventional constructions of PTMFs (such as the encryption algorithm of the probabilistic encryption scheme in the proof of Theorem 3 and Appendix A), where randomness is considered as part of the input tape, the definitions of [20, 21] consider randomness as part of the key tape. 8 We call a PTMF of the latter type, a probabilistic PTMFs (PPTMF). Intuitively, a PPTMF is simply an ordinary PTMF Q with part of the key used for randomness, so that two different keys are "equivalent" provided only their random bits are different.
Formally, a PPTMF is any pair of the type (Q, τ ), where Q ∈ PTMF and τ is an equivalence relation on K Q that partitions K Q into equivalence classes, s.t. ∀q 1 , q 2 ∈ K Q : τ (q 1 , q 2 ) = 1 ⇐⇒ only the random bits of q 1 , q 2 are different.
We denote the set of all PPTMFs by PPTMF.
Definition 10. In the following, let (Q, τ ) ∈ PPTMF.
1. Let q ∈ K Q . Then:
Conclusion
In this work, we initiated a formal study of White-Box Cryptography (WBC) and investigated its relationship with obfuscation. We presented definitions and (im)possibility results for obfuscators of specific classes of 'interesting' programs families -those that are not approx. learnable. The security requirements of WBC is captured by means of a White-Box Property (WBP), which is defined for some scheme and a security notion (we call the pair a specification). The security requirement of an obfuscator is captured using a soundness property. We showed that WBP and soundness are in general quite independent of each other by giving some examples where one is satisfied but the other is not.
Although the WBP is defined for a particular (family, specification) pair, soundness is only defined for a given family and is independent of the specification. A natural question is whether there exist non-trivial families for which the WBP w.r.t. every specification can be reduced to the soundness of an obfuscator for that family. Loosely speaking, an obfuscator that achieves this is said to satisfy the Universal White-Box Property (UWBP) for that family. We showed that the UWBP fails for every family that is not approx. learnable. However, we show that under reasonable assumptions there exists an obfuscator O satisfying UWBP for a non-learnable but approx. learnable family. Furthermore, the specification we used for our negative result is quite contrived. Hence, it seems reasonable to expect that a meaningful notion of security for WBC based on WBP can still be achieved for "normal" specifications. As a possible example of this, we presented a (non-trivial) non-approx. learnable family for which there does exist an obfuscator satisfying the WBP in a realworld specification. Additionally, we showed that there exists a (contrived) family Q ∈ ALF\LF for which there exists an obfuscator satisfying UWBP for Q.
